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Abstract
Corruption is connected with the exchange of property rights to rents created 
through the political process. In this perspective, behind every act of corruption 
lies either a modification of the structure of property rights to particular 
resources (imposed and guaranteed by the state) to the advantage of the 
corruptor, or its maintenance notwithstanding a legal obligation or a power to 
alter it in way unfavourable to him; by means of a hidden transaction, corruptor 
and corrupted share property rights to the political rent thus created. Transaction 
costs in corrupt exchanges are usually higher than on the legal markets. Such 
activities as the search for a counterpart, the negotiation of an agreement, the 
implementation of the agreement are extremely expansive since they involve 
two risks; an external one, such as being denounced or being discovered by 
control agencies; and an internal one, such as being cheated by the counterpart. 
The “rules of the game” of corruption dictate to bribers and bribees the adoption 
of strategies which permit them to co-ordinate their efforts at acquisition and 
protection of property rights on political rents. A deterrent against the potential 
breach of corruption contracts can then be found in alternative protective 
agencies. A demand of protection can emerge even in “legal” relationships with 
public bodies, when lack of confidence in the efficiency and impartiality of 
public procedures can make ineffective or not advantageous the “official” 
protection offered by the state to citizens which have contractual relationships 
with its structures or demand other ‘positive rights’ services. Other political 
subjects—as political parties—may then substitute the state in the supply of 
these “public goods” which, through corruption, are privatised and sold 
selectively to those who pay a price (i.e. a bribe) for them, corresponding to a 
quote of the protection rent which can be created and allocated through state's 
action. Those acquiring protection reduce the uncertainty involved in future 
transactions and relations with the state and its agents, counting on the fact that 
their political guarantor will intervene on their behalf should any problems arise. 
Such uncertainty is extremely high in both the illegal market of corruption and 
in contacts with a state sector characterised by inefficiency and/or lack of 
transparency in decision-making processes. The trust in the fulfilment of 
promises or the collection of credits, which is offered by political organisations 
like parties, permits the reduction of otherwise very high transaction costs of 
corruption. The protection provided by the political parties appears important in 
settling the controversies which can emerge between the various agents in 
corrupt exchange, both at central and local level. Controlling the nomination in 
public bodies, the parties can generalise the sanctions connected with the 
violation of the established rules and norms which support property rights over 
political rents, at the same time guaranteeing the continuity of the system over 
time, in a wider time-horizon which goes beyond changes in the public 
personnel.
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1. Property Rights, Protection, and Corruption
Any individual who participates voluntarily in a market exchange obtains a gain 
equal to the difference between the value attached to the “commodity” received 
and that relinquished. Where the value of this surplus exceeds the transaction 
cost for both parts, it can be expected that the exchange will take place to their 
mutual satisfaction, other circumstances permitting. The same logic applies also 
to the exchange taking place on the market of corruption. This presents however 
some peculiarities. First of all, transaction costs are usually higher than on the 
legal markets. Such activities as the search for a counterpart, the negotiation of 
an agreement, the exchange of “goods”, the implementation of the agreement 
are extremely expansive since they involve two risks: an external one, such as 
being denounced or being discovered by control agencies; and an internal one, 
such as being cheated by the counterpart. The second characteristic is that the 
corrupt agent does not invest his own resources, but resources belonging to the 
public body he is part of. Instead of using these resources according to the rules, 
the corrupt agent—thanks to the malfunctioning of the control mechanism— 
exercise on these resources an informal property right, selling them as if they 
were his property1.
In general terms, “property rights of individuals over assets consist of the 
right, or the power, to consume, obtain income from, and alienate these assets. 
Obtaining income from and alienating assets require exchange; exchange is the 
mutual ceding of rights” (Barzel 1989, 2)2. Transactions in markets, if voluntary, 
advantage all the parties involved, although in different measure according to 
the form of the market and the related bargaining power. State activity, like 
market exchanges, modifies the structure of property rights in existence. 
Actually, as observed by Benson and Baden, “governments operate by 
assigning, reassigning, modifying, or attenuating property rights (...). Regulation 
can easily be described from a property right perspective. Governments regulate 
by creating and enforcing property rights and by more or less continuously 
modifying and changing the allocation of previously existing rights” (Benson 
and Baden 1985, 392). The modification of property rights imposed by state 
coercitive power might instead be disadvantageous, or more or less favourable 
for private parts, depending not only on impartial procedures, but even on the 
discretionary choices of public agents. Potential corruptors are interested in 
those public decisions which assign benefits or impose costs; in other words, 
those decisions which modify to their advantage the system of property rights to 
resources administered by the state—or subject to state regulation—through the 
activity of its bureaucrats or political representatives. The difference between 
the value assigned by a private to such resources and what they effectively pay 
(or receive) in order to acquire (or to release) property rights on them is, in 
economic term, a rent. I will call it political rent, since it is created though the
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use of political power.
For example, both control of public spending and the right to license 
(permitting or not the exercise of certain private sector activities) produce 
artificial restrictions in access to public benefits and the enjoyment of private 
resources, thus creating politically conditions of scarcity. The state produces 
then opportunities for gaining such scarce property rights, which are assigned to 
citizens on the basis of decisions and procedures controlled by public agents. 
Just like market-produced resources, these represent a legitimate source of 
enrichment. People thus have an incentive to influence—even through 
corruption—to their advantage this discretionary allocation of rights on political 
rents3. Corruption is then connected with the exchange of property rights to 
rents created through the political process: “Corruption is actually just a black 
market for the property rights over which politicians and bureaucrats have 
allocative power. Rather than assigning right according to political power, rights 
are sold to the highest bidder” (Benson 1990, 159).
In this perspective:
a) behind every act of corruption lies either a modification of the structure 
of property rights to particular resources (imposed and guaranteed by the 
state) to the advantage of the corruptor, or its maintenance 
notwithstanding a legal obligation or a power to alter it in way 
unfavourable to him;
b) by means of a hidden transaction, corruptor and corrupted share 
property rights to the political rent thus created. The corrupted official in 
fact obtains a part of that rent in return for his services, which aim to 
guarantee (or at least increase the chances of) the granting of those 
property rights, usually in the form of a bribe.
Therefore, all else being equal, the greater the resources which pass through the 
hands of politicians or functionaries, the greater the opportunities for corruption:
the greater government interference in private matters the greater will be its use and 
abuse; the more the material to be exploited the more that can be generated from it ... 
The ruling class appropriates the property of others not only for its own use but also to 
give a part to those of the governed who ensure its power with both arms and cunning; 
with the help that a client provides a patron (Pareto 1916, 635-6)4.
However, the magnitude of public intervention is not the sole factor influencing 
the spread of corruption. There are cases, such as the Scandinavian countries, 
where large-scale public intervention in the economy and society is 
accompanied with low levels of corruption, according to Transparency
4
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International rankings.
Actually any system of public decision making can create opportunities 
for corruption, since it alters the structure of property rights. This can occur just 
as easily in a state which reduces the extent of its activities (even in one which 
limits itself to mere regulation or prohibition of certain behaviour) as in one 
which enlarges it. Rose Ackerman notes, for example, that “Corruption 
originates from the forms of monopolistic power created in the state apparatuses 
by both an excess or a lack of regulation” (1994, 67). Individuals may resort to 
corruption to obviate the effects of a weak state or underdeveloped market, 
seeking protection from politicians and functionaries whose degree of autonomy 
is increased by the uncertainty or absence of rules. The collapse of the state, or 
its abandonment of certain areas of activity may also fuel corruption through a 
weakening of controls and the creation of uncertainty over private property 
rights. The process of restoring private property in the former Soviet Union and 
in the other socialist-bloc countries led to numerous cases of misappropriation 
(Kaufmann and Siegelbaum, 1997; Mendras 1996), as did the privatisation and 
market deregulation processes in Western Europe or in Latin America (Manzetti 
and Blake, 1996; Saba and Manzetti, 1997), where the disvestiture of 
government owned assets created occasions for corruption involving high 
ranking government officials. The present section has demonstrated that 
opportunities for corruption arise from the various forms of public activity 
which create rents; these are present (although to differing degrees) in any state, 
whether it is laissez-faire or interventionist.5 Moreover, while neo-liberals claim 
that excessive state presence is responsible for the contemporary explosion of 
corruption, for others deregulation and “virulent attacks on state intervention, 
the welfare state and the bureaucracy” have lowered the moral costs of 
corruption by blurring the “lines of distinction between collective and individual 
interest and between the public and private spheres” (Meny 1996, 315).
It is not just the extent of property rights in public rents which is 
important, but also how they are assigned. The more predictable the identity of 
future beneficiaries of public decisions, the greater the convenience of 
corruption. Thus, if an impartial procedure (drawing lots, for example) is used to 
assign such rights rather than a discretionary decision there will be no incentive 
for corruption. In addition, the more general and broadly applicable a decision, 
the fewer the opportunities for corruption because the cost and difficulty of 
collective action increases with the number of individuals who may benefit from 
the distribution of a rent. Each will have an incentive to free-ride, taking 
advantage of the corruption employed by the others (Olson, 1965). Where only a 
few individuals are affected, on the other hand, the use of corruption to 
influence political decisions becomes much easier. For these reasons, political 
processes tending to generalise the benefits accruing from state action represent
5
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an effective barrier to corruption.
The transfer, capture and protection of rights is associated with transaction 
costs, resulting from individuals’ attempt to determine what the valued attributes 
of any commodity are and to capture those attributes which remain poorly 
delineated. The definition of property rights is strictly connected with the 
possibility of enforcing the corresponding ‘right’ or claim through protective 
agencies. In fact: “The rights people have over assets (including themselves and 
other people) are not a constant; they are a function of their own direct efforts at 
protection, of other people's capture attempts, and of government protection” 
(Barzel 1989, 2). Besides self-protection and government-protection, there are 
forms of protection offered by other non-public agencies. This is the case, for 
instance, of Mafia activities described by Reuter (1983) and Gambetta (1993). 
According to their theoretical framework, the main and most specific activity of 
mafiosi is the supply of a peculiar commodity, dispute settlement or private 
protection. As Gambetta observes: “Mafiosi are first and foremost entrepreneurs 
in one particular commodity - protection - and this is what distinguishes them 
from simple criminals, simple entrepreneurs, or criminal entrepreneurs” 
(Gambetta 1993, 19). Protection must be chiefly intended as a resolution of 
quarrels, the defence of agreements and property rights, and sanctions on the 
breach of private contracts. Instead of being offered by the state as a public 
good, protection is sold arbitrarily and selectively by mafiosi, often helped by 
violent promotions. The system of property rights is then determined by the 
disponibility to pay of individuals. As in a modern hobbesian 'state of nature', 
mafiosi guarantees of criminal activities like theft can be interpreted as an 
affirmation of the robber's property right: “The existence of theft makes the 
distinction between economic and legal rights clear; it also highlights the notion 
that economic rights are never absolute. Thieves lack legal rughts over what 
they steal; nevertheless, they are able to consume it and to exclude others from 
it, to derive income from it, and to alienate it. Each of these capabilities is an 
attribute of ownership. The lack of legal rights may reduce the value of these 
capabilities, but it does not negate them” (Barzel 1989, 110)6. These rights 
depend, in part, on protection efforts made by the state or by other private 
agencies.
Mafiosi operate typically in markets and social relations where trust 
among individuals is fragile, or less than required by a society regulated by 
normal negotiation strategies. A demand for “trust” in potential partners emerge 
when protection is either inefficiently supplied or cannot be supplied at all by 
the state as a public good7. This is the case, for example, in black and illegal 
markets: in illegal transactions the threat of law enforcement agencies, the fear 
of deception, the absence of law enforcement, the uncertainty of property rights, 
the imperfect flow of information, all contribute to make the demand for
6
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protection significantly higher than in ordinary competitive markets. Mafiosi 
provide to private individuals and to other criminals guarantees against defection 
from hidden agreement, obtaining a quote of the surplus of the transaction. In 
economic terms, we could think of a 'second level' market, in which the 
commodity exchanged - protection - is necessary for the success of 'first level' 
illegal transactions.
Producing, 'advertising' and selling private protection is interpreted by 
Gambetta as an economic activity, whose peculiarities reflect some 
characteristics of the commodity. Different resources are necessary to become 
an 'efficient' protection dealer. For example, it is needed a capital of reputation, 
consisting in a credible capacity of sanctioning. A good reputation in fact makes 
it possible to economise in the effective use of violence: “A reputation for 
credible protection and protection itself tend to be one and the same thing. The 
more robust the reputation of a protection firm, the less the need to have 
recourse to the resources which support that reputation" (Gambetta 1993, 44)8. 
Violence is not the core of mafiosi activity, but a necessary mean to offer a 
credible protection. As 'input' of a costly 'productive' process, violence will be 
economised when possible.
By its nature, the supply of protection services requires monopoly: “In 
highly organised societies the production of this utility, protection, is one of the 
functions of a special association or enterprise called government. Indeed, one 
of the most distinctive characteristics of governments is their attempt to create 
law and order by using force themselves and by controlling through various 
means the use of force by others. The more successful a government in 
monopolising all use of force between men within a particular area, the more 
efficient is its maintenance of law and order. Accordingly, the production of 
protection is a natural monopoly. The territorial extent of this monopoly is 
prescribed more or less loosely by military geography and historical 
circumstances” (Lane 1966, 384). The capacity of violence is mutually exclusive 
and must be showed continuously to reinforce reputation. Intimidation power is 
then strongly connected with the territory, as well as other essential resource as 
information and secrecy. Mafia structure is presumably given by a set of local 
monopolies of private violence, which in turn may ignore, co-operate or combat 
each other.
The same logic can be applied to the protection services which can be 
demanded by corruptors and corruptees in the market for political rents. 
Potential corruptors are interested in those public decisions which modify, in a 
way favourable to them, the system of property rights to resources administered 
by the state - or subject to state regulation. The “rules of the game” of corruption 
dictate to bribers and bribees the adoption of strategies which permit them to
7
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coordinate their efforts at acquisition and protection of property rights on 
political rents. First, the creation, allocation and exchange of political rents and 
bribes is part of an illegal transaction which obviously can not be enforced 
through courts or equivalent public agencies. A deterrent against the potential 
breach of corruption contracts can then be found in alternative protective 
agencies. Secondly, a demand of protection can emerge even in “legal” 
relationships with public bodies. In fact, mistrust and lack of confidence in the 
efficiency and impartiality of public procedures can make ineffective or not 
advantageous the “official” protection offered by the state to citizens which have 
contractual relationships with its structures or demand other ‘positive rights’ 
services from the government. Other political subjects—as political parties— 
may then substitute the state in the supply of these “public goods” which, 
through corruption, are privatised and sold selectively to those who pay a price 
(i.e. a bribe) for them, corresponding to a quote of the protection rent which can 
be created and allocated through state's activities.
In paragraph 2 I will analyze more closely some contexts of corrupt 
exchanges where a demand for protective services has been observed. In 
paragraph 3 I will examine how in the Italian context political parties have 
supplied private protection, both in the illegal sphere and in the “official” 
relationships between entrepreneurs, citizens and the state.
2. THE DEMAND SIDE OF THE MARKET FOR POLITICAL 
PROTECTION
The probability of being denounced or buying a “lemon” in the corrupt 
exchange increases when its generalization makes the reliability of unknown 
partners more difficult to ascertain, trust is a very scarce resource, and ties 
among different illegal activities make the risk of exposure higher. A factor 
which could reduce transaction costs is the consolidation of a system of informal 
rules and norms regulating corrupt exchanges. Actually, in the Italian system of 
corruption was observed a sort of spontaneous evolution of norms dictating 
when, how and how much should be paid. In this paragraph I will try to show 
how such quantitative characteristics of political corruption may have an impact 
on its qualitative aspects. In other words, when levels of corruption cross a 
certain threshold, we can observe a more or less “spontaneous” emergence of 
“institutional” devices for the regulation of the increasingly complex networks 
of exchange.
In Italy, the markets for corrupt exchange created a structure of invisible 
norms more powerful than the laws of the state. The latter could be violated with 
impunity, while anyone who challenged the conventions of the illicit market
8
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would meet with certain punishment. Those occupying the principal public roles 
moved around easily within this pervasive system of hidden exchange, 
legislating and directing the affairs of the state and of other public entities. At 
the same time, they acted as guarantors for the functioning of the illegal markets 
which directed every public action of any economic importance. The careers of
r politicians and public functionaries depended on their ability in creating networks of clandestine contacts and investing politically the proceeds of corruption. On the other side of the market, citizen and businessmen's lack of 
trust in the impartiality and efficiency of public action augmented the demand 
for purchasing favors and protection. In these circumstances, the interests of all 
actors involved lay in accepting the status quo, receiving or paying bribes, rather
Lthan in denouncing corruption, despite the fact that some of them might be aware of the disastrous effects of such behaviour for the collectivity.
7
2.1. The “Norms” Regulating Political Corruption
In the Italian context, the “oiling” function of informal convenctions and norms 
has been described by ex-judge Antonio Di Pietro:
‘There is an objective situation in which those who must pay no longer even wait to be 
asked. Knowing that in a given 'environment' one pays a bribe or protection money 
they too promise to pay. In the same way, those receiving the money no longer need 
lower themselves to require or ask for it but simply wait, since they know that it will 
arrive eventually anyway. In short, hints on the part of the briber and threats and 
inducements on the part of the public official no longer take place" (Di Pietro 1991, 
2) .
To understand this situation it is necessary to analyse the system of informal 
norms which regulate relations between corruptor and corrupted. These norms 
do indeed “have a life of their own” insofar as they have not been purposely 
created, or if they have been are respected independently of this fact. When the 
“rules” of corruption become an invisible guide to behaviour the relations 
between the actors in hidden exchange appear to follow a prepared script, 
reducing to a minimum uncertainty and tension. Mario Chiesa, the first victim of 
the mani pulite investigations, described the tranquil and unembarrassed 
atmosphere in which bribes circulated, even on the first occasion he consigned 
money to Carlo Tognoli, his political patron: “I handed him the envelope of 
money, casually, like offering a friend a coffee. He thanked me without asking 
anything. He knew there was money in the envelope but did not ask where it 
came from, which tender produced it or the percentage of the payoff. Bribery 
has its etiquette. You accept and say thank you without displaying curiosity” 
(Andreoli 1993, 61-2). There are no negotiations or demands; no suspicions or 
worries arise. To conclude successfully the transaction with the minimum of risk 
it is sufficient to follow the etiquette of corruption.
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How do the “rules of the game” in corruption emerge? In many of the 
cases described by protagonists in the mani pulite investigations a process of 
progressive and reproduced adhesion to prevailing models of behaviour can be 
observed. To borrow an expression from Hayek, this can be considered an 
example of the “spontaneous evolution of rules of behaviour”. By obeying the 
illegal conventions corruptors and corrupted obtain a desirable, but not 
intentionally sought, result: the ordered functioning of the market.9 It is in 
everyone's interest to follow the rules precisely because the others have done so 
in the past and can be expected to do so in the future.10 As one entrepreneur 
described it, the evolution of the rules is the fruit of the actions but not the 
intentions of those involved in the corruption market:
We found ourselves in a perverse situation, overrun by events; the situation became 
insupportable. How did it start? It’s not that one day someone said 'Well, now we 
should ...' Things evolved a little at a time and ended up in a situation like the one that 
has exploded ... There has been a enormous evolution in the last ten years, I would say
(Un giomo in Pretura, RAI 3, 22/2/1993).
According to Maurizio Prada, Cristian Democrat bribe-cashier in Milan, the 
system “grew by itself... There was never any 'mastermind'” (PM, 25).
The existence of informal norms eases the entry of new actors into the 
market. In most cases there is little alternative to obedience for the newcomer 
who becomes aware of them, efforts at persuasion or intimidation thus being 
unnecessary. Spontaneous adaptation to the rules in force also allows a saving to 
be made on the costs of gathering information (Ullmann-Marglitt 1977, 86; 
Good 1989, 51). The “cashier” of the Milanese PLI (Partito Liberate Italiano), 
Giacomo Properzj, described this process:
“I became President of the AEM in May 1987 and remained so until autumn 1990. As 
soon as I took on the position I was approached by Fiorentino Enrico who told me that 
there was a group of firms ... who normally contributed sums of money for the party 
system. I say this to make clear that the system of cash payments preceded my taking 
the post and I confined myself to the acceptance of what, according to Fiorentino, was 
an established practice” (CD, n. 231, 22/3/1993, 5).
When this norm has been consolidated bribes are paid principally because 
everyone takes it for granted that this will happen. One administrator, of the firm 
ICOMEC, claimed that “in the long term, payment is not connected to a specific 
cause, tending to become a kind of custom in relations with that public 
organisation. This is demonstrated by the fact that in many cases payments 
continue even when the functionary changes, regardless of the physical person” 
(TRIM, 62). In this way the identification and transaction costs of hidden 
exchange are drastically reduced.
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Where corruption is systemic bribery not only extends to every state 
activity, but precise rates of payment tend to emerge, reducing the risk of 
endless negotiation between corruptor and corrupted. In fact, in corrupt 
exchange the amount to be paid for the illegal services received, their price, 
must be fixed. When corrupt exchanges take place with a certain frequency, then 
once a “price” has been fixed in some way—either by agreement, diktat or the 
application of a “tariff’ valid in another context—those involved may tacitly 
agree to replicate it in the future or can attempt to attain better conditions. When 
a common conviction arises that a given “price” is known and agreed then what 
amounts to a rule, the X per cent rule, may emerge. In fact, where the 
probability of obtaining a more favourable price is outweighed by the risks and 
costs of re-negotiation, the tacit repetition of the previously agreed price is the 
most convenient solution.11 Precise tariffs applied to different kinds of services 
have been revealed. According to a Milanese businessman “the tariffs paid to 
the parties were fixed: 5 per cent on building contracts, 10 per cent on cleaning 
services and 15 per cent on maintenance and refurbishment” (La Repubblica, 
1/5/1992, 5).
2.2. The market for political protection
Sometimes the informal norms above described are self-sutaining, that is, it is in 
the interest of all corrupt actors to comply with them. When this does not 
happen, the “order” of the market for corruption could collapse into an 
hobbesian “state of nature” characterized by sequence of risky disputes, rows, 
mutual accusations, “lemons”. Political guarantors have the power to prevent or 
settle disputes arising with regard to both legal and illegal activities: bribes 
unpaid, services promised but not performed, the non-fulfilment of contracts or 
inadequate protection of rights through state inefficiency. Those acquiring 
protection reduce the uncertainty involved in future transactions and relations 
with the state and its agents, counting on the fact that someone - a political 
guarantor - will intervene on their behalf should any problems arise. Such 
uncertainty is extremely high in both the illegal market of corruption and in 
contacts with a state sector characterised by inefficiency and/or lack of 
transparency in decision-making processes.
Since its nature is sometimes impalpable—when “everything runs 
smoothly” the price paid for protection may seem useless, but that is precisely 
the reason why that price was paid: to make things run smoothly—there is a 
certain degree of ambiguity between genuine protection and extortion. This is 
confirmed by the contrasting tones of the way the word “protection” sounds:
11
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
“One is comforting, the other ominous. With one tone, ‘protection’ calls up images of 
the shelter against danger provided by a powerful friend, a large insurance policy, a s 
sturdy roof. With the other, it evokes a racket in which a strong man forces merchants 
to pay tribute in order to avoid damage (...). Which image the word ‘protection’ brings 
in mind depends mainly on our assessment of the reality and externality of the threat. 
Someone who produces both the danger and, at a price, the shield against it is a 
racketeer. Someone who provides a needed shield but has a little control over the 
danger’s appearance qualifies as a legitimate potector, especially if his price is no 
higher than his competitors’. Someone who supplies reliable, low-priced shielding 
both from local racketeers and from outside marauders make the best offer of all” 
(Tilly 1985, 170-1).
There are, however, different attributes of protection which are supplied and 
exchanged in the corruption market, referring to different bundles of “rights” 
over disputed political rents. Since the measurement of these levels of protection 
is often too costly to be entirely accurate, the potential for wealth capture—fraud 
or extortion—is always present for guarantors: even if protection can reduce 
transaction costs, providing a deterrent against defection in contractual 
agreements, its “production” and selling entails other kinds of transaction costs.
2.2.1. The protection of corrupt exchanges
Illegal by definition, there can be no legal recourse for settling disputes within 
the market of corruption. The risk of being “sold a lemon” in such a situation 
can become extremely high, also because the transaction is non-simultaneous in 
nature and one party must rely on the word of the others. Having secured their 
payoff politicians might fail to deliver what they promised; an entrepreneur, 
having won the contract, may forget to pay the bribe promised12. A case in point 
is the experience of Antonio Gregni, an entrepreneur seeking to persuade the 
Sicilian Region to buy him out of his failing enterprise: “he made payments 
amounting to about 350 million to a regional deputy powerful enough to be 
known as 'the boss'. He turned out to be a 'delinquent' who, after making ‘a lot of 
promises’, 'stole [Gregni's] money'" (CD, n. 98, 4/10/1992, 5). Neither are 
entrepreneurs necessarily more “honest”. As one Ansaldo manager recalled: 
“Let's just say the money was promised to the parties but then we stalled, asking 
to pay in instalments ...” {La Repubblica, 30-31/5/1993, 15).
When the network of exchange is more complex and based on deferred 
payments, the risk of defection becomes higher. For instance, the firms involved 
in corruption may represent fertile ground for the placement of clients indicated 
by politicians. Luigi Bosso, managing director of the Napoletanagas, took on 
personnel on the basis of the importance of the politician making the request: 
“When I take on personnel I choose the persons indicated by all the parties with 
whom I have relations. For the higher level politicians, the faction chiefs of the 
majority parties, the general rule is to keep them happy ... in order to have their
12
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support. They can influence those within their party who occupy administrative 
positions” (La Repubblica, 19/12/1993, 4). In this way corrupt politicians extend 
their influence into the private sector as well, giving rise to a triangular 
exchange permitting the allocation of public goods to be transformed directly 
into political support (Fig. 1).
Politician
hiring by politician's recommendation 
Figure 1: Influence of corrupt politicians on the private sector
The firms run the risk, however, that personnel assumed in this way will have 
little desire to work and their political protection will therefore be an 
unsustainable burden. Gabriele Serriello, a Neapolitan manager, stated: “I was 
obliged to hire innumerable people by the DC and PSI, all strongly 
recommended. They had no desire whatsoever to work and were incompetent in 
the majority of cases. In the end it was too much: the labour costs, for that kind 
of personnel, were too high ... So they asked for money and I paid it” (La 
Repubblica 16/3/1993, 8). Instead of hiring a hundred clients little disposed to 
work, Serriello preferred to pay 1.3 billion lire in order to obtain the 350 billion 
tender for the privatisation of municipal refuse collection.
Fear of being “sold a lemon” may result in otherwise profitable 
transactions being passed up and a demand for protection will arise. By handing 
a third party the power to sanction agreements and intervene to discipline the 
market both corrupted and corrupters protect themselves from any improper 
behaviour. Where this demand meets someone both willing and able to satisfy it, 
a portion of the money from the market of corruption will go to this external 
guarantor who, being a sort of “judge”, has the power to resolve disputes and 
inflict sanctions to those who breach the “contracts” of corruption. In such cases 
the bribe split into two quotes, each having a distinct destinations and paying for 
a distinct service. Correspondingly, such market is organized into two levels: in
13
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the first property rights on political rents are exchanged with bribes; in the 
second, a guarantee against the risks of defection is acquired by political 
protectors. The Milanese magistrates remarked:
‘Those who demanded (or received at least) these bribes retained only a part, and that 
not always. More often they were also forwarded to other more powerful politicians 
who, regardless of whether they held public office, were or would be guarantor on 
those directly responsible for success in the tender and in the management of the 
contract, because of their influence over those who did” (CD, n. 266, 13/4/1993, 2).
To ensure that difficulties did not arise, agreements were sometimes made 
dependent on the presence of a guarantor. When the broker Adriano Zampini 
offered a bribe in exchange for the purchase of a property of his by the 
commune of Turin, the assessor responsible replied: “Could be interesting, but 
we'll have to find a guarantor ... someone who can link everybody up ... You 
might speak to Enzo [Biffi Gentile, the deputy mayor] about it”. The Turin 
magistrates noted that “by the term guarantor ... Zampini means someone in a 
position, on the one hand, to ensure that the entrepreneur actually pays the bribe; 
on the other, that the public functionaries would act 'accordingly', ensuring a 
satisfactory outcome to the whole operation” (QGT, 362).
Disputes might arise over agreements for sharing out bribes among a 
number of politicians or over the sub-division of public works among a cartel of 
entrepreneurs, paralysing the market and increasing the risk that the magistrates’ 
attention would be drawn. As will be seen below, these forms of protection 
could be supplied by a variety of political actors, as influential individuals, party 
factions or official party bodies or organisations, depending on the scale of 
activity in the “production” and selling of political rents—at local or central 
level —, on the frequency of the exchange, on the amount or resources involved 
(della Porta and Vannucci, 1999).
2.2.2. Protection from Other Corrupt Agents
Even a extortionists’ gang has an interests in maintaining exclusive control over 
their victims, preventing that others take advantage of them: “Protection is 
primarily against the one who offers it, but it has to include protection against 
rival taxing authority” (Schelling 1984, 185). A similar process occurs in the 
market of corruption: more powerful political agents protect their “clients” 
against demands for bribes from others because in doing so they can collect a 
greater amount with lower risk. Thus, in a context of widespread corruption one 
person may be paid simply in order to avoid paying many and paying 
continually. A protection against rival corrupt agents permits to avoid one of the 
main drawbacks of bribery within a democratic system with widespread 
corruption, i.e. the multiplication of bribes corresponding to the multi-level
14
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dispersion of power in the decision-making procedure. As observed by a French 
functionaire, former chief of the intelligence service: “Higher bribes [in 
international corruption] were paid to functionaires of democratic industrialized 
countries, not of third world dictatures. (...) Functionaries of democratic 
countries demand higher bribes because the money must be split up amongst a 
lot of people, presumibly to buy the silence of many, while in dictatures the 
bribe goes directly to the top, undivided” (quoted in Savona and Mezzanotte 
1998, 90).
The entrepreneur Angelo Simontacchi claimed, for example, that “paying 
at the level of the national secretariat allowed [him] to refuse the demands of 
individual local politicians” (II Giornale, 14/1/1993, 4).13 The protection of 
given individuals against unexpected requests of bribes increasingly directs the 
attention of the less important corrupt agents to those remaining, thus 
heightening the desirability of a long-term protection “contract”. A spontaneous 
demand for political protection can then emerge, being the subjection to a 
leading “authority” in the corruption system preferable to the persistance in an 
“anarchistic” equilibrium, where every public agent may ask for a bribe.14 Of 
course, when somebody in the political-administrative context has bought an 
effective safeguard against widespread corruption, low-level corrupt agents tend 
to concentrate their attention on the remaining ones. Although this form of 
protection bribery may begin with the imposition of a “cut” on a certain number 
of reluctant victims, it can then create a chain of voluntary requests for 
“protective umbrellas” from those who initially remain without defense against 
increased demands of bribes.15
2.2.3. Political Protection Against State Inefficiency
The “structural” inefficiency of Italian public administration permits politicians 
and bureaucrats to “privatize” and sell the resources of their office in exchange 
for bribes. The discretional power accompanying administrative inefficiency can 
be used to further the interests of aspiring corrupters: thus, corruption feeds on 
inefficiency. The spread of corruption is facilitated by the malfunctioning of the 
public administration. Corruption can sometimes be seen as a way to create “fast 
lane” to administrative decisions for those who are willing to pay bribes or 
speed money. For example, when long delays in carrying out certain procedures 
become the rule, even a functionary who limits himself to performing his job 
within the time foreseen by the regulations can demand a bribe in exchange for 
this by now unanticipated “service”. As observed by a Sicilian politician: “The 
administrative paralysis transforms all civic rights in favors. If you need a 
certificate or a building permits, and if you wait for them for two years or so, 
eventually you ask for them and pay for them as a favor” (La Repubblica 
October 17, 1991).
15
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
Corruption, in turn, not only produces but also promotes inefficiency16. 
First, corruption has social costs—’The damage to the public administration 
caused by the necessity for entrepreneurs, drained to the profit of the accused, of 
making up the losses sustained from extortion and the consequent elevation of 
the costs, poor execution of the works, proliferation of price revisions, execution 
of non-contractual work and requirement for supplementary technical 
evaluation, has been very serious” (TRIS, 434). Moreover,-if, one of the 
objectives of functionaries is to collect bribes, they have an interest in fostering 
the conditions of procedural delay, viscosity and unpredictability which widen 
the margins for corrupt transactions: “Many files are kept opened, because this 
is the better way to keep all under fire”, so complains a Milanese entrepreneur 
(Fipe 1992 54). Similarly, a Sicilian businessman recalls: “there was the 
frequent need to pay the politicians, ... in order to avoid to displease those who, 
with their influence and prestige, could eliminate the obstacles preceding and 
following the adjudication of public contracts” (CD n. 450 2). The 
unsatisfactory performance of the public administration associated with these 
delays and deficiencies offsets or negates the collective interest supposedly 
served by such norms: “The procedure becomes longer and more complicated ... 
Waiting time becomes more important than working time” (Cassese 1983, 284). 
In any case, “institutions and their functionaries are not held responsible for 
remaining inactive, for taking no decision at a ll... It soon becomes clear that it is 
more dangerous to decide (a decision involving the possibility of error and 
punishment) than not to decide” (Freddi 1992, 226). In such a situation “time” 
becomes more valuable, as do the incentives to “buy” it through bribery. Finally, 
administrative inefficiency obstructs investigations into corruption by lending 
formal justification for a vast range of actions taken by corrupt functionaries 
before organs of control. The judges who investigated political corruption in 
Bari observed that: “the immunity [for corrupted politicians] derives from that 
involution in the bureaucratic course that insure the post-hoc demonstration of 
the claimed delays” (TRIB 267). At the same time, verification of administrative 
inefficiency is powerfully hampered by acts of corruption, which conceal both 
the real motives for and the outcomes of public decisions.
Italian corruption was probably favoured even by the expansion, 
particularly from the 1960s, of the functions of the state and other public 
agencies in regulation and control. In general, the greater the amount of property 
rights over political rents passing through the hands of politicians or 
functionaries who have a certain power of allocation over them, or who have 
access to restricted information concerning the criteria for their allocation, the 
greater (all other circumstances being equal) the opportunities for corruption17. 
This creates an escalation in the number of contacts between individual citizens 
and public entities as a result of the extended range of pertinence of laws and 
regulations. Associated with ineffective administrative controls, unpredictable
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and inefficient procedures, lack of trust in official protective agencies as courts 
and administrative tribunals, it emerges a proportional increase in friction, 
confrontation and contention between citizens and the public apparatus. At the 
same time, the risk increases of normative overlaps, assimilation, partial 
abrogation, exceptions and contradictions needing to be resolved at judicial 
level. According to a Milanese entrepreneur:
“If we had to respect all the legal norms when we start an economic enterprises, we could 
forget about it ... According to the law, before starting any activity, you need to have all 
permits and authorizations under your own name. Obviously, this put the entrepreneur in 
a situation of direct dependency from the public officials, who can control or not control, 
enforce the rules or do not enforce them” (Fipe 1992, 64-5).
Legislative proliferation (and confusion) is a further factor aggravating 
inefficiency and increasing the power of functionaries. As another businessman 
put it: “Lots of laws and mini-laws simply increase the power of functionaries to 
blackmail entrepreneurs. Even if the latter are convinced that they are respecting 
the law they cannot be sure and therefore prefer to pay bribes” (Benassi and 
Sganga, 1994, 42). Many such norms are clearly inefficient because, through an 
unclear definition of individual cases, they encourages contravention or because 
the rules are too many and overly imprecise.
As observed above, administrative inefficiency has multiplied the 
occasions where citizens or businessmen have an interest in asserting their right 
to certain public services or resources, thus giving rise to a demand for political 
protection. By paying bribes to those with long-term influence over the exercise 
of public power, corrupters hope to prevent contentions with the state or to 
resolve them quickly to their advantage. When the public and impartial 
protection offered by the state's laws is uncertain or ineffective, the private and 
selective protection offered by a given centre of power may appear more 
convenient and effectual. The entrepreneur Fabrizio Garampelli explained the 
substitutability of public protection offered by an inefficient judiciary system 
with private protection guaranteed by private organization like parties:
“Knowing that civil law suits can go on for more than six years the Commune of 
Milan put an incredible weapon in the hands of public officials (political and 
otherwise) when, five or six years ago, it abolished the possibility of arbitration as 
means of resolving the situation in a matter of months. For that reason, construction 
companies could not evade certain demands; demands which were not, probably, 
specific to the one job but more general, coming from a contract which probably was 
not strictly linked to that particular job” (“Un giomo in pretura”, RAI3 TV, 
22/2/1993).
Administrators thus acquire arbitrary power which permits them to obstruct even 
quite legitimately anticipated decisions without running any particular risk.
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Their discretional power and informational advantages makes them able to 
threaten to deny (or to delay) due rights, in order to collect bribes. If private 
parties have sufficiently frequent contact with public institutions, therefore, it 
will be in their interest to find longer-term protection avoiding such “regulatory 
blackmail” (Mogiliansky, 1994). The entrepreneur in search of public contracts 
will then look for an influential political partner who will be paid on a regular 
basis in return for wide-ranging protection from state inefficiency. The 
entrepreneur Vincenzo Lodigiani noted:
‘Thousands of problems can and do arise in the awarding of contracts and supplies 
and all the way through the contracting process ... Enterprises are therefore under the 
necessity of preventing the legal representatives of public bodies, or someone acting 
for them inside such bodies, from making their lives difficult ... Rather than 
continually submit to the phenomena described above Lodigiani sought to protect 
itself by negotiating directly with the centre, the national secretariats of the parties” 
(TNM, 42).
In turn, the poor functioning of the public administration generates widespread 
scepticism among citizens and entrepreneurs concerning the efficiency and 
impartiality of the procedures which regulate access to the state; in other words, 
in the possibility of enjoying those rights sanctioned by the law. Corrupt 
politicians and bureaucrats have an interest in presenting the functioning of the 
public administration as inefficient and unpredictable because then they can 
selectively offer protection from such uncertainty. In exchange for bribes they 
are willing to guarantee speedier consideration of particular cases, favourable 
interpretation of the regulations, simpler procedures or a positive outcome in 
controversies with the public administration. Where corruption reaches those 
centres of power which influence the rules agents must follow, irrational and 
contorted procedures will multiply as the organizational structure comes to 
reflect the interests of those who are corrupt. In other words, the “external 
effect” even of apparently “beneficial” corruption is a change in the rules and 
practices of the public administration which leads to a greater overall 
inefficiency of the system. This encourages the creation of privileged channels 
of communication with the public administration — regarding services, 
contracts or jobs — in order to obtain profits, reduce waiting times or forestall 
other potential corruptors. The “demand” for protection which is created in these 
ways produces selective inclusion of private actors on the basis of their 
willingness to pay bribes. Growing corruption, in turn, creates increasing 
pessimism concerning the arbitrariness of administrative action Dissatisfaction 
with the functioning of the public administration and the incentives to obtain 
protection through bribery thus increase among those initially excluded from the 
market of corruption. Precisely through attempts to get round it by bribery, 
belief in the dishonesty of public agents is destined to proliferate autonomously, 
by a sort of chain reaction.
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A great deal of evidence has been found on the interdependence of 
maladministration and corruption. On the one hand, maladministration 
(sometimes resulting from inertia, sometimes from able maneuvering) increases 
the discretional and arbitrary power of the administrators in each phase of the 
process leading to the “purchase” of public measures by bribery: from the 
creation of artificial demand to the contamination of the system of adjudication 
and the weakening of controls. On the other hand, maladministration causes a 
growth of mistrust in the public administration, and of pessimistic expectations 
concerning the effective enjoyment of rights sanctioned by law, on the part of 
citizens and entrepreneurs. As a result, privileged channels of access to public 
decisions are soughtjrrespective of whether they refer to enjoyment of a service 
or competition for a public contracts, jobs etc. The necessity for privileged 
channels increases willingness to “buy” access by paying bribes Tin other words, 
the demand for protection. Through the diffusion of corrupt practices, in fact, a 
selective inclusion of those who pay is realized. Corruption therefore increases 
inefficiency, recommencing the vicious circle.
A correlation (p=-0,904) between perceptions of corruption and 
(dis)satisfaction in the functiong of the public administration in 11 European 
countries can be highlighted using the 1995 Transparency International index 
and the levels of satisfaction in the way democracy works, from the 1994 
Eurobarometer trends.
Fig.l: TI corruption index and dissatisfaction in the way 
democracy works
9 For • Bel . 5 7
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In such a context, the successful conclusion of a particolar case comes to depend 
from the personalization of protective relations with the public bureaucracy and 
the political system. This in turn promotes mistrust and dissatisfaction in the 
way democracy works, encouraging the creation of privileged channels of 
communication with the public administration—regarding services, contracts, 
rights, or jobs—in order to obtain property rights on political rents, reduce 
waiting times, or forestall other potential corrupters.
2.2.4. Political Protection from Competition
Under normal conditions total freedom of entry into the market for political 
protection does not exist. Those who arrive too late, do not inspire trust or are 
simply not liked, therefore, will find themselves frozen out. Thanks to the 
protection they receive from competition, entrepreneurs operating in the public 
sector are able to obtain higher profits than they would otherwise — in other 
words, property rights on a political rent. In fact:
“In a protected market a potential dealer faces a cost of entry higher than the cost 
which would be strictly necessary where the market not protected. From the point of 
view of the new entrant, this may look like extortion. But from the point of view of 
thiose dealers already buying protection, the extra cost imposed on the new entrant is 
precisely one of the reasons they pay for protection in the first place: to deter new 
competitors" (Gambetta, 1993, 31-2).
A politician who did not select among those demanding protection would find it 
difficult to ensure they all received preferential treatment. Moreover, the 
inability to reconcile incompatible requests would increase the risk of 
denunciations being made by dissatisfied clients18. Thirdly, as Shleifer and 
Vishny emphasize, “keeping corruption secret requires keeping down the 
number of people involved in giving and receiving bribes” (1993, 615). 
Competition among bribers, on the other hand, increases the price of corruption 
as the following account, by an entrepreneur, makes clear19:
“1 got in touch ... and said I was willing to pay a bribe ... He stated that he could not 
guarantee anything as there were other firms interested and I realised the offer I had 
made was not high enough. When I informed [another manager of the same firm] he 
got angry with me because I had not made a higher offer, of 5-6 per cent. He told me 
not to bother, he would take care of it” (TRIM, 78).
Beyond a certain point, however, for the corrupt administrator the advantages of 
competition tend to diminish, since there is a limit to the size of bribe that can be 
paid. It can be assumed, therefore, that each centre of power has a precise 
interest in limiting the number of corrupters to whom they offer protection. 
According to the manager of the Ligresti group, for example, the group paid 
seven billion to the PSI in the expectation that they “would be included in a
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small circle of entrepreneurs who had demonstrated their friendship towards t|>è 
Socialist Party” (L'Espresso, 6/12/1992, 60). Entry into the protejtjpn nçgürket 
was encouraged by the perception of important economic advantages for those 
who could secure their place. Nevol Querci, extraordinary commissioner of the 
Inadel stated: “It is true that in recent years a circumscribed group of about 20 
entrepreneurs has emerged ... who, on the one hand, contributed to covering the 
expenses of the DC and PSI and on the other received favoured treatment where 
real estate was to be purchased” (TNM, 76).
If there is an effective political protection against competitors, a decision 
to participate in “forbidden” tenders, make a bid different to that agreed or 
refrain from paying one's part of a bribe - depending on the content of the 
collusive agreement - loses much of its attractiveness. Effective protection, 
therefore, may be aimed more at preventing challenges to the cartel than at 
punishing them. It can be expected that, where cartels are present, the firms 
involved correspond to the coalition of politicians guaranteeing the continuity of 
business in terms of their market influence and political orientation. Thus in Bari 
“an agreement had been reached between all the biggest firms of the city and the 
politicians” in relation to tenders for schools, and “a precise coupling between 
company X and party X had been created in order that each party was assured a 
bribe of 5 per cent of the gross value of the works tendered” (TRIB, 66). At 
times the collusive agreement between the political parties predates and causes 
an identical division in the economic field. Thus in relation to many public 
contracting procedures in the Veneto area “the agreement between the parties 
(DC and PSI) on the distribution of bribes came first, and afterwards the 
enterprises were chosen according to their importance .... political colouring, 
trustworthiness for the system and recommendations from those who count” 
(APV, II). The market for public works was thus founded on a two-way 
collusion: the agreement on bribery among politicians favours collusion among 
participants in tendering and vice versa.20
A number of entrepreneurs—specialized in satisfying public demand— 
have correspondingly shown an interest in establishing long lasting relationships 
with centers of political power. In a similar context, the awareness or even the 
simple expectation that corruption is widespread and that others can take 
advantage of it is a strong incentive for seeking privileged links with political 
power. Precisely through attempts to get around it by bribery, however, belief in 
the dishonesty of public agents is destined to proliferate autonomously. In the 
first place, someone who engages successfully in bribery receives a 
confirmation of their pessimistic expectations. At the same time, mistrust 
spreads among those who do not pay the price of political protection and 
therefore find, for no other apparent reason, that they are discriminated against. 
For instance, an entrepreneur excluded from tendering for a contract with the
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Italian Railways, connected this fact with the presence of a notoriously “well- 
connected” competitor: “We realized immediately that the cards, as you might 
say, had already been dealt” (PR, 85). Afterwards he redoubled his efforts to 
enter the restricted circle of corrupters. The alternative is the exit from the public 
sector market, but barriers to poor administration are in fact increasingly 
weakened by the expulsion or marginalization of those protagonists more hostile 
to corruption, since the risk of complaints diminishes. It also reinforce the belief 
that corruption is inevitable. Mario Chiesa, first “victim” of “mani pulite”, has 
claimed: “There was a feeling of impunity. It might seem incredible, but I’ve 
never asked for a penny from anyone in my life. Not because I was particularly 
decent and honest; it just wasn’t necessary. If you came to me proposing to sell 
me 100 million worth of equipment and I smiled you would have said: This is 
the sum at your disposal” (Panorama, 13 December 1992, 46). The attempt to 
bypass the inefficiency and arbitrariness of the state by purchasing individual 
protection is destined to fail. It spreads and consolidates the very distrust 
underlying it in an ever wider spiral of corruption.
As a result of high levels of corruption, we may add, a form of extortion 
concerns primarily entrepreneurs who do not pay bribes and taxpayers who are 
forced to finance such illegal practices. In a similar context, in fact, “honest” 
entrepreneurs are obliged to suffer a cost from the corruption of others, coming 
up against an insurmountable barrier to entering the public market, while the 
fiscal charge of common citizens grows in correspondence with the joined 
appropriation of political rents by corrupt agents and protected entrepreneurs.
2.3. The Price of Political Protection
Clearly the different forms of protection described above are often interwoven, 
both in reality and in the expectations of those paying for guarantee. Bribes paid 
for this more general protection rather than a specific service is, to all intents 
and purposes, a tax paid to political protectors, either at a fixed rate or in 
proportion to profits. Reflecting the nature of the service acquired, this form of 
payment also has the advantage of reducing the possibility of criminal 
proceedings, since it is harder to prove that it is in fact illegal. This fact had not 
escaped Bettino Craxi, former leader of PSI; according to the entrepreneur 
Ottavio Pisante:
De Toma [the PSI’s exactor] told me Craxi had identified about 20 major Italian firms 
who, if they wanted to survive in business, would have to commit themselves to 
making regular cash payments to the PSI, in the order of about two billion a year ... In 
other words, Craxi realised the penal dangers of associating levies of money with 
individual tenders and intended to forfeit them against annual contributions” (TNM, 
83).
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The sums of money paid by “contributors”, then, become a kind of “insurance 
policy” taken out against the difficulties and obstacles which may arise for those 
wanting to obtain property right on political rents or to maintain periodic 
relations with public bodies—a “contract” to be taken up only where required: to 
unblock a particular dossier, silence an over-zealous inspector or speed up a 
given operation. A protected entrepreneur is able to confront his political and 
bureaucratic interlocutors without undue worry. Having won the tender to 
construct a sports complex, the entrepreneur Romagnoli encountered just these 
kinds of difficulty and decided to seek political protection:
“Having won the contract we were forced to recognise that there were malcontents and 
objections ... We realised that we needed political-entrepreneurial protection to have 
any chance of finishing the work successfully and avoid pretexts for obstructionism 
and delay ... I therefore tried to identify the leading representatives of the political 
system ... realising that this was the only way to ensure a certain amount of tranquillity 
in order to see the project through. They told me that they had the power to intervene 
with the traditional political parties but drew my attention to the fact that these parties 
needed money” (TM, 142-3).
On other hand, as Vincenzo Lodigiani recalled:
“Both Citaristi and Balzamo [administrative secretaries of DC and PS1] told me, not 
long after the middle of the 1980s, that it was necessary to agree a contribution that 
Lodigiani (like all the other companies, incidentally) would pay to the DC and PSI's 
coffers, systematically and regularly, independent of individual tenders or orders ... In 
return they guaranteed, on behalf of their parties, that the necessary steps to prevent 
any obstructionism would be taken with those responsible for Lodigiani’s orders” 
(TNM, 43).
This demand for protection was in fact met by specialized supplier, which used 
their political organization to collect bribes and protection money.
3. POLITICAL PARTIES AND THE MARKET FOR POLITICAL 
PROTECTION
The emerging of a demand for political protection in corrupt exchanges does not 
imply that it will be met by a corresponding supply. What we can say is that 
there are “gains from trade” to be made in this market, and that money is a 
valuable commodity within political parties and careers. If moral or institutional 
constraints are not strong enough to discourage such dealings, we can expect 
that protective services will be provided by several specialized suppliers, as 
political parties, in exchange for protection money or other resources (consent, 
support, etc.).
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Therefore, not necessarily there is extortion when bribes are paid in 
exchange for nothing more than the performance of a duty, without any other 
apparent return. In fact, bribes can be directed towards political patrons or 
guarantors. Those engaging in corruption may be seeking to obtain a generic 
protection for their entrepreneurial activities and for their exchange relations 
with the public administration and its corrupt agents. For example, when a 
supplier pays a bribe in order to avoid administrative inefficiencies and delays, 
there may be a voluntary, not extorsive transaction if those unfavourable 
conditions are not under complete control of the corrupt agent, who can 
nevertheless attenuate their costly consequences. Paying such bribes the 
entrepreneur purchases the right to continue working in a protected market 
which, like the public sector, offers the possibility of substantial gains.
A firm “twinning” with a centre of power generally hopes to obtain 
protection in its dealings with public institutions, discourage competition and 
protect itself from the dangers of being cheated in corrupt exchanges. According 
to the ex-President of the INADEL, Nevol Querci, hidden exchange sometimes 
takes place on a one-off basis (with immediate payment) while in other cases 
protection is based on a long-term “contract”: “All acquisitions were from 
entrepreneurs for whom the party had given me the go-ahead. In some cases the 
entrepreneur paid directly to the national secretariats of the parties, and 
afterwards I would be given the green light. In others, they paid the money 
directly to me” (TNM, 76). The activity of protection-seeking thus becomes 
essential for understanding the behaviour of entrepreneurs specialised in the 
public sector. The magistrate Piercamillo Davigo has noted that “the enterprises 
implicated in the system of corruption (...) are scared to stand on their own two 
feet, preferring to seek protection, and will do anything to remove even the 
possibility of competition” (Davigo 1993, 9). From this point of view, seemingly 
bizarre phenomena can be explained: take, for example, the marked tendency for 
Italian firms, notwithstanding the legal dangers, to create and openly display 
political relations, up to the point of being “internalized” (to use an economic 
term) by the centres of political power to whom they entrust part of their 
entrepreneurial initiatives. Actually, “contracts of protection”, by which political 
guarantee is exchanged for bribes, are more effective when they are long term. 
This is the description offered by the former mayor of Reggio Calabria, 
Licandro:
“[A surveyor of the Lodigiani firm] explained to me that they gave 4.5 per cent of the 
value of the work contracted. Three percent was for local politicians, including the big 
names: faction leaders or others important for some reason. The rest was for Rome. 
But for that they paid in a regular way, not in relation to each individual contract. 
Permanent relationships are preferred by the firms which pay bribes for public 
contracts, and all of them do. The relationship consolidates; its less risky like that. 
There's no need to start over again every time, having to intercept the right person and
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running the risk of being cheated” (Licandro and Varano 1993, 83).
This ambiguous nature of protection is not lost on those who trade in it. Where 
firms maintain enduring relations with public organisations, short-term, 
intermittent protective services present serious inconveniences for both protector 
and protected. As for the protector, it may become difficult for a politician to 
impede that previously protected forms are helped even when they are not 
regular with payments21, or that they turn to someone else in an “extra- 
contractual” period. Intruders without backing or even swindlers can taken 
advantage of such interruptions. For instance, in a secretly-recorded meeting 
Bruno Lucari, ex-Assessor of the Lazio Region, vividly displayed his surprise 
and annoyance on discovering that he had been backing a firm without 
protection:
Assessor: “You mean you did fuck all till now?”
Entrepreneur: “No, fortunately not, I told you.”
Assessor: “What arseholes!!! ... I sign everything ... face up to everything ... You saw 
the continuation and enlargement of the works I got ... I did that ... I don't know who 
you are. I thought you people knew somebody. Get the idea?” (La Repubblica, 
15/11/1991,7).
As for the protected, a precise political mark simplifies dangerous activities, as 
the experience of a middleman in Bari reveals: “It was well known that such and 
such a firm was connected with such and such a party. Thus when the person to 
whom the envelopes or packets of money should be paid was not specifically 
stated, he already knew precisely to whom the consignment should be made” 
(TRIB, 271). On the other hand, with short-term protection contracts, the 
protected enterprise risks having to operate in an insecure environment, facing 
bureaucratic obstruction or being put under pressure even when up to date with 
bribery payments. Both parties, therefore, have a common interest in creating a 
relationship of indefinite duration; in these cases, as it has been observed for the 
Italian Mafia, “protection works better through prevention rather than repression 
(...) Thus, protection is a potentially infinite sequence of acts which cannot be 
identified or distinguished from one another” (Gambetta 1993, 56).
A demand for protection tends to emerge in every social context 
characterized by high levels of corruption, when transaction costs concerning 
property rights over political rents are higher, and the “natural” relationships 
between citizens and the state tend to generate conflicts and mistrust. Political 
organizations can respond to such demands, supplying protection which can 
surrogate such lack of trust in the state. As Pizzomo observes:
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“We could say that the party system in Italy was not a partecipation system anymore, 
having become a protection system. (...) A good politician, especially at the local 
level, was mainly a good protection supplier. A firm could find it profitable to belong 
to a political area—which does not mean necessarily a party’s area, but even a 
fraction’s area, or even an area close to a certain political actor. (...) It could then 
obtain public contracts, privileged information, absence of controls, and so on. 
Sometimes there was no specific benefits, but the firm could simply be admitted to the 
‘inner circle’, to acquire e privileged and protected citizenship” (Pizzomo 1996, 269).
Actually, a protective role of political parties is deeply rooted within their 
institutional functions. According to Galeotti and Breton, political parties can be 
seen as guarantor of the performance of both representatives and citizens in the 
political-electoral exchange:
“Political parties are the loci of property rights through which the promises and 
expectations of citizens and of representatives are transformed into quasi or implicit 
contracts and through which these contractual arrangements are 'enforced'. Political 
parties can fulfil that functions because they are networks of relationships based on 
trust. The links that constitute the networks and embody the trust can be strong or 
weak and can vary over time and as circumstances change. These bonds of trust are 
what support property rights and, therefore, permit exchange to take place (1986, 54)
The accountability of representatives in political exchanges is highly vulnerable 
to defection, since the terms of the implicit contract are naturally uncertain, 
being based on “bundles of promises” of public policies advanced by candidates 
at discrete time intervals. It then becomes relatively easy for political 
representatives and citizens to renege the promises or contractual agreements 
they have made each other. In other words, transaction costs of political 
exchange are very high, since rights over such political resources are far from 
being clearly delineated, and people will often find in their interest to try to 
capture such values.
The repetition of these complex and multi-levels networks of political 
exchange can require parties as institutional device for the guarantee of the 
fulfilment of promises in the activity of political intermediation:
“If a representative of interests wants to obtain a specific measure, he can offer in 
exchange to the decision maker specific resources at his disposal (money, favors, 
votes, etc.). But this exchange remains bilateral, and with a more or less immediate 
nature. In order to make possible transaction which last in time, and which involve an 
high number of actors (and resources may then circulate) it is needed the intervention 
of a class of middlemen, and a guarantee of trust in them, which is made necessary by 
the non-contextuality of payments. The party, with its lasting structure and his public 
exposition, can be considered as a form of guarantee of political intermediation. A sort 
of institute for political credit, which is made possible by that continuous verify of the 
quantity of credit disponsable, which takes place in the electoral process” (Pizzomo, 
1993, 275).
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The guarantee of trust furnished by political parties reinforces the beliefs or 
expectations that promises reciprocally made in the political market by A and B 
will be honoured: “Because trust is always defined in terms of promises and 
fulfilment of promises and is, therefore, necessarily a time-dependent process, 
the costs incurred by A and B produce a capital asset which, not only permits A 
and B to trade with each other, but allows them to trade at a lower cost than 
would otherwise be possible. The consequent reduction in transaction cost is the 
(gross) yield on trust” (Breton and Wintrobe 1986, 55). The accumulation of 
trust within the political parties permits the sanctioning of other trades which— 
like those between citizens and representatives—are not legally enforceable, nor 
are self-enforcing.
Parties can therefore produce trust, which is used to guarantee political 
exchanges, through several mechanisms. First, in political parties there is a 
repeated interaction among people with shared ends, which permits them to 
discover that they could gain by trading reciprocally trusting and cooperating. 
Secondly, time horizon of political parties is generally longer than single 
individuals’: since parties “stay in business” for a longer time, the short-term 
gains from defection (which prevent trust from developing) are proportionally 
less attractive for parties than for individuals. It then becomes convenient for 
political parties to sanction their “cheaters”, preventing trust from being 
breached through defection of their representatives and “lame-duck” 
officeholders. Finally, there is a “reputational” effect which is connected with 
the public adoption of a recognizable set of promises and opinions by a political 
party, and which then becomes a sort of his own trade-mark: to maintain its 
value, the party must be trustworthy, not deviating too much from them. Once 
formed, the networks of trust which reinforce the structure of political 
organizations serve to guarantee that the promises to exchange made by 
representatives and citizens will be sanctioned, “but more importantly, thay 
impart a continuity over time to the exchange process, which the intervals 
between elections would appear to belie (...). In a word, the larger the trust, the 
lower the transaction costs and the more continuos the political exchange 
process” (Breton and Wintrobe, 1986, 56).
Trust and protection produced within political parties support property 
rights which make possible to realize the “gains from trade” implicit in political 
exchanges. Actually, as we have seen, a demand for protection emerges in 
another context: the hidden market for corrupt exchanges. As the currency 
issued by the state is guaranteed as official medium of exchange, so the trust in 
the fulfilment of promises or the collection of credits, which is offered by 
political organizations like parties, permits the reduction of otherwise very high 
transaction costs of corruption. Authority within parties become then a resource 
for the strengthening of beliefs or expectations that persons will honor their
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promises in the corruption market, or in their uncertain relationships with the 
state. The availability of an external guarantor means that it is no longer 
necessary to trust one's partner in corrupt exchange personally (although both 
partners must of course be convinced of the protector's ability to enforce the 
agreement). Political protection is not supported, as in the case of the state and 
the criminal organizations, by the credible threat of violence, and may 
correspondingly be less effective. Moreover, private protection can reduce the 
transaction costs of corruption, but since it is not supplied by the state as a 
“public good”, it must be bought privately by a potentially fraudulent seller. In 
fact, also in this second-level market for political protection, often a necessary 
condition for the first-level corrupt exchanges of property rights on political 
rents, there is the risk of buying a “lemon”, that is to pay for a false protection. 
The party’s organization—with its institutional system of sanctions and 
incentives—can nevertheless generate lasting expectations of trustworthiness in 
the protection market, posing itself at the top of an informal hierarchy of 
political protection individual suppliers.
As stressed in paragraph 2.2.1., the presence of an external guarantor is 
sometimes a necessary pre-condition to overcome the reciprocal distrust of 
contracting parties. The protection provided by the political parties appears 
important in settling the controversies which can emerge between the various 
agents in corrupt exchange, both at central and local level. As for every scarce 
and valuable commodity, political guarantees can then be demanded and 
supplied in exchange for a price, i.e. a quote of the bribe. Such a situation 
emerged over the contract for providing conveyor belts for the port of 
Manfredonia. The entrepreneur in question had to pay a bribe of five per cent to 
Wladimiro Curatolo, a member of the DC. The latter would then be responsible 
for dividing the money between the various parties involved. An argument broke 
out, however, among members of the PSI and the situation of the entrepreneur 
became critical. “Things were already agreed when Curatolo appeared saying, 
'As of now I only represent the DC and PSDI. The Socialists are fighting among 
themselves and I don't want to have anything to do with it'. I protested but there 
was nothing to be done” {La Repubblica, 16/2/1993, 11). To overcome his 
problem the entrepreneur was obliged to contact the National Administrative 
Secretary of the PSI, Vincenzo Balzamo: “On hearing of the matter and the 
value of the contract”, the latter “told me that given the amount involved I 
should have gone directly to him and took the responsibility for dealing with the 
hot potato. When Balzamo contacted me he told me that he had been in touch 
with Manfredonia and the situation was a very difficult one. He then told me 
that he personally would contact the three PSI members involved” (CD, n. 202, 
8/2/1993, 5). The three local PSI members were obliged to accept the arbitration 
of the central administrative structure of the party (handing over half of their 
expected bribe to Balzamo) and the situation, which was dangerous for the party
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as well, was resolved. The entrepreneur continued: “It was Balzamo himself 
who later told me that it had been hard with the three ... they were tough 
customers and untouchable. In the end though he was able to impose his point of 
view. In any case, after Balzamo's intervention I had the proof that things had 
gone well ... because the work went better; without problems” (CD, n. 241, 
30/3/1993, 5).
Moreover, the party presence in the public administration offers to the 
various participants in hidden transactions the possibility of distributing 
sanctions, such as exclusion from the corrupt game, to punish those who defect. 
The internal risks of corruption, that is the transaction costs related to the 
probability of breach of corruption contracts, can in fact be reduced by the 
system of incentives and sanctions managed by the party’s structure. On the 
other hand, when corruption becomes widespread, the internal structure of 
political parties becomes more fragmented, with many local “feuds” organized 
around local bosses as semi-autonomous centers of power: “On the territory it 
emerges a network of political machines aimed at making widespread, 
continuative and reciprocally protected corrupt exchanges” (Belligni, 1995, 
178). Political parties are then divided into factions financially and politically 
autonomous, which can reach hidden agreements and form alliances with other 
groups and fractions and sectors of the bureaucracy (Pizzorno, 1996, 268).
If political finance is not, in itself, a source of corruption, it can 
nevertheless generate corruption when, as in the Italian case, the state has a wide 
power of designation into public and private roles: who occupies those roles has 
incentives to take bribes buying with (part of) them the protection required from 
political parties and leaders. Political protection is in fact a pre-requisite for 
careers in political roles as well as in the public administration. The 
segmentation of corrupt political parties is confirmed by the analysis of bribe 
flows, which only in some cases were collected by central party treasury (as in 
the Pci-Pds case, or in the Psi and Dc case for more important firms), being 
otherwise destined to local centers of power (as influential politicians, fractions, 
etc.). Other factors which may have increased the recourse to corruption are the 
reduction of parties’ internal sources of financing (due to crisis in partecipation 
and lack of support), the multiplication of political actors (as new parties, 
factions, groups) which are not directly financed by the parties, the lack of 
precise limits to expenditures posed by the law to political actors (Comitato di 
studio 1996, 19).
>
In the circumstances of illegality associated with hidden transactions, the 
political parties can be likened to a credit agency managing trust between the 
various parties involved (Pizzorno 1992, 32-33). Given their widespread power 
of nominating the upper levels of public bodies, the parties can sanction
2 9
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
particular transactions thanks to their punitive power over political 
administrators and private individuals, guaranteeing the fulfilment of secret 
agreements and the overall functioning of the illegal market within distributive 
‘norms' created over time (Vannucci 1997a). The parties power of reinforcing 
delegation, procuring advantages for the representatives (the party apparatus, in 
other words) (Pizzorno, 1971), makes the internal protection essential for having 
rights to the participation of the selective sharing of “dividends” (in terms of 
status, power, money) of the organization. In fact, these functions were “paid” 
by the allocation of a “supplementary” quota of the bribes to the parties, over 
and above that received by individual administrators involved in the decisions 
necessary for closing the secret deal. As Maurizio Prada, DC “treasurer” of 
Milan revealingly explains: “Even before 1987 I received contributions from 
certain companies and continued to do so after the end of my mandate as 
president of the ATM in 1990 ... In other words, the companies paid me because 
I was one of the local treasurers of the Democrazia Cristiana” (in TM, 74). 
Controlling the nomination in public bodies, the parties can generalize the 
sanctions connected with the violation of the established rules and norms which 
support property rights over political rents, at the same time guaranteeing the 
continuity of the system over time, in a wider time-horizon which goes beyond 
changes in the public personnel. Mechanisms of political control over 
nomination and careers within the public administration become not only a 
system of socialization and “certification of trust” in corrupt exchanges, but also 
a system of institutional disincentives: those who respect corrupt contracts can 
be guaranteed in their attempts to gain property rights over political rents, 
anyone who defects, denouncing or exiting from the corrupt game, will be 
punished through enduring marginalization from the system of political 
protection.
There is another source of transaction costs which determines a demand 
for protection: the external risks of bribery, linked to the possibility of being 
denounced and exposed to the repressive action of social control agencies, must 
also be minimized in order to reduce the incidence of transaction costs in corupt 
dealings. The guarantee of protection from the action of magistrates is another 
essential function fulfilled by political parties. In Italy in the last decades various 
strategies based upon intimidation have been adopted against magistrates who 
pierced the circle of political illegality: pressure by superiors more sensitive to 
“political needs”, marginalization or transferal, even assassinations, in the case 
of investigations unveiling the relationships between organized crime and 
politicians. Inquiries were removed as quickly as possible from the magistrates 
responsible for the initiative and transferred to judicial seats more inclined to 
suppress the matter. As recent investigations indicated, several judges received 
political protection as well as considerable economic “compensations” - more or 
less hidden forms of bribes - for their services of judicial protection offered to
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corrupters and corrupted, powerful Masonic brothers, Mafiosi and secret service 
agents. In particular, recent inquieries have described an hidden network of 
corrupt judges of the Tribunal of Rome that sold their sentences and acts in 
particularly valuable cases, being paid by entrepreneurs and “friends” lawyers 
who operated as brokers (L'Espresso June 12, 1997, 60-63). Before mani pulite, 
political protection against judicial inquieries proved to be effective. Politicians 
under investigation or suspected of responsibility could then quickly hide 
themselves beneath the protective umbrella of parliamentary immunity, almost 
invariably an insuperable barrier.22
As a consequence of the stipulation of protection contracts between 
political organization (as parties, fractions, etc.) and private organization as 
firms there is a blurring of the line of demarcation between political and 
economic power, which produces a dangerous overlap of roles and interests. 
Actually, numerous corrupting firms were distinguished by a party label. In 
return for the informal use of this “trademark” - which ensured a good 
reputation and a stable and prolonged influence on public decision-making - 
party enterprises provided stable finance for that particular centre of power. The 
entrepreneur Romano Tranci claimed, for example: “In our field we're known to 
be 'friendly' with the PCI ... There is a continuous and organic relationship of 
contribution and support between our group and the PCI in the sense that we 
consider ourselves integrated in the system of the party and as such part of our 
proceeds go to it.” The “trademark of protection” must be identifiable so that 
local administrators have a firm idea of enterprise's position and do not create 
problems. For this reason the contributions made to the party (three billion lire 
over eight years) were paid by “participating at L'Unità [the party's daily paper] 
festivals throughout Italy, by sponsoring the Party Almanac ... What Assessor, 
knowing our serious and organic links with the party, would demand a bribe?” 
(L'Espresso, 4/4/1993, 59). With these political ties firms can plan future 
investment and activities with greater certainty, without having to overcome 
“political” obstacles. The Milanese cashier of the Socialist Party, Sergio 
Radaelli, recounted that he had been approached by an entrepreneur who was 
looking for protection: “He gave me a white envelope filled with money (...). He 
simply said: 'I have good relationship with the party, but I am not able to meet 
the mayor” (TM, 59).
The personal component which characterizes many illegal relations 
becomes less important in such cases. As already noted, a collector for bribes— 
the administrative secretary, or someone else trusted by the party leadership and 
informally charged with this task—is secretly selected within the parties and 
firms then deal with them, regardless of the individual delegated at any 
particular moment. A fixed annual sum given to the cashier of the party with 
whom relations are maintained, as a sort of tax, appears the standard form of
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payment. Augusto Rezzonico, a member of the DC, recalls: “Many 
entrepreneurs came with money asking to be introduced within institutional 
organs ... The Rght Hon. Citaristi [party administrative secretary] was the person 
who managed relations between the enterprises and public bodies in order to 
establish a privileged channel of access to public contracts” (Panorama, 
6/12/1992, 47).
On their side, the politicians nominated or elected in the governing bodies 
of public enterprises—who need the support of their party for their career—have 
all the interest in actively favouring party-protected enterprises. Pierfranco 
Paletti, nominated by the Republican Party in the governing body of the ENEL, 
stated: “The firm Fochi from Bologna, that has received contracts from the 
ENEL, is considered as ‘friend’ of the PRI. As such, I acted in order to protect it 
for public tenders” (CD, n. 246, 30/3/1993, 7). Firms will have an incentive to 
follow the advice of their political protector who, pocketing a sum proportional 
to the political rents, will seek to direct them towards the most fruitful 
opportunities. Salvatore Ligresti has stated, for example: “The Socialist 
secretariat had a general disposition in favour of my group, also because of the 
periodic contributions we paid. As far as I know it was not us who pressed for 
the success of this or that initiative. The politicians decided autonomously, case 
by case, which of our initiatives to sponsor” (L'Espresso, 6/12/1992, 58). 
According to Roberto Buzio, collaborator of the PSDI’s secretary Cariglia, from 
an agreement between the latter and the Minister of Public Works Prandini “the 
PSDI had the right to single out three ‘friend’-enterprises to whom the ANAS 
would have given tenders and from whom we could autonomously receive the 
money we wanted. I singled out three enterprises, and named them to Prandini” 
(CD, n. 443, 24/6/1993, 4). A high degree of identification thus develops 
between firm and political protector; a congruity of interests and objectives 
cemented on occasions by active political involvement on the part of the 
entrepreneur. However, in this symbiotic relationship there may be some 
drawbacks: by tying its fortunes to those of a particular centre of political power 
a firm exposes its prospects of profit in the public markets to the natural 
turbulence of party competition: mobility of particular leaders; shifting 
coalitions; internal political conflict; electoral uncertainty.
4. CONCLUSION
The mani pulite inquiry, which has temporarily halted the perverse ascending 
spiral of corruption and inefficiency, had many beneficial effects on Italian 
politics and administration23. Nonetheless, the action of the magistrates has 
broken only one of the rings in the chain of reciprocal causation by increasing 
the perception of the risks involved in corruption. Exasperating slowness,
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unjustified delays, normative complexity, procedural quagmire, clientelistic 
practices, organized crime protection—in other words, the components of the 
structural inefficiency in public activity which feeds individual demands of 
protection—continue to be present. As observed by one of the judges of mani 
pulite, Gherardo Colombo:
“It is nonetheless impressing, disappointing, and frustrating for professional effort, 
that in the last four years not a law nor a measure has been adopted to make inquiries 
easier or - at least to a certain extent - corruption more difficult. Not a measure to 
modify controls, making them more effective, not a measure to remove from public 
administration all those who for dozen of years have sold their function”(Colombo 
1996, 154).
Nor the prevailing cultural and ethical attitude of public administrators and 
citizens, the observed lack of “sense of the state” and civic culture, is 
presumably changed in the last years, maintaining weak moral barriers to 
corruption.
Recent data seem to reinforce this pessimistic stance. In Transparency 
International index on the perception of corruption Italy constantly remained in 
the first place among western industrialized countries. In the last few years there 
has been no significant change both in relative and absolute terms, being the 
lack of trust in the honesty of Italian political and bureaucratic élite almost 
constant on very high levels. A confirmation could be found in another statistic, 
made by different public opinion polls over 43 countries. Italian citizens are the 
most pessimistic: 42 per cent of them has a consideration of the Italian political 
class as the “most corrupt in the world” (La Repubblica, November 12, 1997, 
20). Nor mani pulite inquiry seems to have had significant effects on the attitude 
of businessmen: according to an opinion poll made by Swg-Confesercenti (28- 
29 January 1997), 50,5 per cent of commercial entrepreneurs hold corruption to 
be as widespread as in the past, 23,3 per cent believe in a reduction, 18,3 in an 
increase. Meaningfully, almost the same result emerged from an analogous poll 
made in 1992, shortly after the beginning of mani pulite. The wall of mistrust in 
the political and bureaucratic class is very difficult to knock down.
Many entrepreneurs observe that at the present the main effect of mani 
pulite seems to be an increase in the “price” of corrupt exchange—the bribe 
paid—to compensate the higher perception of the risks of this illegal dealing, 
with no perceptible reduction in the total amount of corruption. As noted by an 
entrepreneur: “Before 'mani pulite' the bribe could vary from 5 to 10 percent of 
the public contract value. Now to corrupt is more expensive and public 
administrators try to use more sophisticated techniques to hide their corruption” 
(Benassi e Sganga, 1994, 48). The dynamics of the market for corrupt exchange 
are then influenced by the increase in the risk of exposure, not enough to make
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the expected costs higher than its benefits, but modifying the structure (and the 
price) of corrupt transactions recently brought into light. Illegal conventions and 
informal norms are still effective, but trustworthy political guarantors are not 
available (or have not enough power to effectively enforce illegal agreements 
and protect them from judicial inquiries anymore). The scarce supply of political 
protection, in turn, increases the transaction costs and consequently the amount 
of bribes paid in the corrupt exchanges. Italian corruption seems to be 
“submerged” again, and more difficult to find out, but still widespread. This 
causes a more limited and cautious circulation of restricted information 
concerning individual willingness to corrupt exchanges, increasing the 
“internal” risks of incurring in a fraud from “dishonest” partners, or in a 
denounce from “honest” ones (Davigo, 1998). Anyway, without any institutional 
reform, the persistent possibility of obtaining property rights on huge political 
rents brings about a strong demand for corrupt activities. In this new equilibrium 
the price of corruption becomes higher, but the number of transaction is not 
significantly reduced (or may even have increased). Actually, it is difficult to 
consider this as an achievement.
Alberto Vannucci 
Department of Political Sciences 
University of Pisa
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ENDNOTES
1 The enduring nature of these illegal earning opportunities, as observed by Jagahhathan 
(1986, 127), “implies the creation of intangible property rights within these systems”. The 
discretionary choice of a politician to “sell” his decision-making power will be rational if the 
net advantage anticipated is greater than that which could be got from legally exercising that 
power, or, more generally, if no more remunerative use exists for the resources employed in 
corruption.
2 These property rights refer to scarce goods (material or otherwise): “Property rights are 
understood as the sanctioned behavioural relations among men that arise from the existence 
of goods and pertain to their use. These relations specify the norms of behaviour with respect 
to goods that each and every person must observe in his daily interactions with other persons, 
or bear the cost of non-observance” (Furebotn and Pejovich 1974, 3).
3 When the priority of public agents is the (unproductive) search for gain rather than the 
raison d'etre of the institution, a loss in organizational efficiency is to be expected. The 
influence cost of such activity is two-fold. One the one hand, the distortion of the decisions 
taken (which would otherwise have been different). On the other, the investment of time and 
effort in appropriating revenue without creating any collective advantage. “Rent seeking on 
the part of potential entrants in a setting where entry is either blocked or can at best reflect 
one-to-one substitutions must generate social waste. Resources (...) might be used to produce 
valued goods and services elsewhere in the economy, whereas nothing of net value is 
produced by rent-seeking” (Buchanan 1980, 8). For a review of the literature on the social 
costs of rent-seeking activities see Buchanan, Tollison and Tullock (1980), Rowley, Tollison 
and Tullock (1987).
4 Tanzi (1994) and Acemoglu and Verdier (1997) emphasize the contribute to the spread of 
corruption given by pervasive public sector and government intervention.
5 The problem of “contractual opportunism” concerns all principal-agent relations, not just the 
public sector. Corruption can also be present in market relations wherever the distribution of 
information between the contracting parties is asymmetrical. The idea that corruption can be 
beaten by the state withdrawing in favour of the market may thus prove illusory: “While it is 
true that perfect competition in all markets will prevent corruption, deregulation will almost 
never lead to the resumption of a market resembling the competitive paradigm. Indeed, many 
of the market failures that justify government intervention are the very same conditions that 
generate corruption in the absence of intervention. Thus scale economies, externalities, and 
products which are unique or of uncertain quality all create incentives for employees to enrich 
themselves at company expense. Deregulation may simply mean the substitution of a corrupt 
private official for a corrupt public one” (Rose Ackerman 1978, 207).
6 The commodity “protection” has some “public good” aspects: once it is offered to some 
individuals, others also benefit from it. To transform protection services into a commodity to 
exchange, Mafia has nourished mistrust and uncertainty concerning property rights, protecting 
criminal activities as well, and has promoted “energetically” its purchase in a general way. 
Moreover, when there is a supply of private protection, mistrust and uncertainty 
spontaneously increase: “Distrust, in other words, becomes endogenous and need no longer to 
be thought of as a precondition external to Mafia protection market” (Gambetta 1993, 27).
7 According to Max Weber, payments to the Mafia are similar to those given to political 
groups in exchange for “extorted services”: ‘These services are initially intermittent, but in 
practice they become 'periodic payments' in exchange for a guarantee of security. This is the
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observation of a Neapolitan builder as given to me 20 years ago, in reply to doubts on the 
efficiency of the Camorra with respect to his business: 'Sir, the Camorra charges me X lire 
each month, but guarantees security - the state takes ten times as much, but does not guarantee 
anything'" (Weber [ 1922], 195).
8 The huge variety of Mafia symbols and initiation rituals can be explained by the nature of 
the commodity protection, whose quality is very difficult to ascertain. Everything which can 
convey information, expectations, emotions, beliefs and reputation about the quality of 
protective services then becomes very valuable. Even "Mafia” or “Cosa Nostra” can be seen 
as successful trademarks of the main protection industry in Sicily. It is an asset which is the 
common property of different families that often fight each other in order to increase their 
market share (Gambetta 1993, 155).
9 ‘The formation of spontaneous orders is the result of their elements following certain rules 
in their responses to their immediate environment ... Society can thus exist only if by a 
process of selection rules have evolved which lead individuals to behave in a manner which 
makes social life possible” (Hayek 1973, 43-4). This principle applies on a smaller scale to 
the “social life” of the market for corruption. Francesco Saverio Borrelli, Milanese Chief 
Prosecutor, states that his impression that “[the system of corruption] is something that has 
grown spontaneously over time. Once it was recognised that the interests of those governing 
and the interests of those who wanted to do business could easily be married in this way, that 
a bargain could be struck and opposition silenced, the phenomenon grew on its own, gaining 
momentum day after day” (PM, 48-9).
10 Naturally, other norms are possible, corresponding to different equilibria. If it is expected 
that the others will inform the authorities of any attempt at corruption then sharing that 
honesty is the best strategy. The spontaneous emergence of a norm in no way imply that its 
effects are desirable, even for those who respect it. For example, when all entrepeneurs 
respect the bribery rule, the benefit for each of them tend to cancel out (MacRae, 1982). 
Nevertheless, even in this case generalized corruption has an intrinsec robustness: no one has 
an interest in evading or defying the system. This is even more so for individuals outside the 
group in which the conventions are formed and observed and who suffer its perverse 
consequences.
11 These costs are particularly high in illegal exchange because they include the danger of 
legal sanctions. This would explain, for example, the annoyance of one entrepreneur, De 
Mico, with the attitude of the director of works in the construction of the Venice prison. 
Contrary to the situation with other corrupt officials it “was never possible to find an 
arrangement to avoid continual disagreements. For four or five years I had to pay according to 
his will and inclinations” (PROM, 649-50).
12 Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny (1995), analyzing privatization processes in Russia, 
emphasize how the non enforceability of corruption contracts in courts usually makes control 
rights on the “goods” and services exchanged uncertain and arbitrary.
13 According to Buchanan (1980, 119), the overall level of crime and the amount of resources 
which must be devoted to law enforcement fall when organised crime has a monopoly: “If 
monopoly in the supply of 'goods' is socially undesirable, monopoly in the supply of 'bads' 
should be socially desirable, precisely because of the output restriction”. On this argument, 
monopoly-based corruption also would be socially preferable to a situation where it is 
practised by a large number of independent actors because the overall extent of the 
phenomenon would be less.
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14 In a similar way, Olson explains the fact that in the 1920's in China people preferred 
warlords who were stationary bandits, countinuosly stealing from a given group of victims, to 
roving bandits who soon departed: “If the stationary bandit successfully monopolizes the theft 
in his domain, then his victims do not need to worry about theft by others. If he steals only 
through regular taxation, then his subjects know that they can keep whatever proportion of 
their output is left after they have paid their taxes. Since all of the settled victims are for him a 
source of tax payments, he also have an incentive to prohibit the murder or maiming of his 
subjects. (...) The monopolization of thefts and the protection of the tax generating subjects 
thereby eliminates anarchy” (1993, 568). In the case of corruption, however, the “output” 
shared with “bandits” is not generated by productive activities: it is instead a political rent 
deriving from state activities influenced by the same “monopolist authority”. In other words, 
such resources are often “stolen” to the public, making these protective agreeement much 
more convenient for both involved parties.
15 Where this expectation of protection is not met protest quickly follows. The public-sector 
manager Zamorani recalls that Pizzarotti, an entrepreneur, “complained about the lack of 
intervention from the centre to deal with local party politicians, it being implicit that he had 
paid or promised to to pay sums of money to the centre and, notwithstanding that, he was still 
meeting with resistance in the periphery” (La Repubblica, 6/10/1992, 17). In fact, the 
effective supply of such protection permits the “internalization” of the costs and risks of 
decentralized bribe-taking, deriving from the simultaneous presence of many indipendent 
corruption rackets (Bardhan, 1997, 1324).
16 For a more detailed analysis of the “vicious circle” which tends to increase simulteanously 
corruption and administrative inefficiency, see Vannucci (1997b).
17 A positive correlation between corruption and the size of U.S. government (measured by 
public spending) emerges from Goel and Nelson (1996). Several indices of economic freedom 
on over 50 countries also show a significant negative correlation with the Transparency 
International index of corruption (Chaufen and Guzman, 1996).
18 A public manager, Zamorani, described the collapse of the system of corruption in the 
ANAS in the following terms: “More recently the firms had continued to pay but it longer 
worked. A nefarious and unproductive cycle developed in which everybody, large or small, 
was on an equal footing and one would pay more than the other in order to get ahead. The 
amount of money available steadily diminished while the number of aspirants for it steadily 
grew” (L'Espresso, 23/8/92, 21).
19 Even in a “free entry” equilibrium corruption can affect the competition among firms, 
reducing their number and guaranteeing rents which are partially given to officials as bribes: 
‘That in tum makes it possible for corrupt officials to demand larger bribes, and so on. This 
does not lead to the eventual extintion of all firms, because when the flow of payments from 
firms to officials reach a high level, the officials are no longer willing to risk the source of 
their bribes exiting” (Bliss and Di Telia 1995, 5-6).
20 The lower the competition in either the political or economic arena (between a number of 
corrupt politicians or corrupting enterprises), the more robust would be collusive agreement in 
the other. In fact, a corrupt politician in search of clients may persuade an entrepreneur to 
defect from the cartel in exchange for a special advantage. Similarly, a particularly 
enterprising entrepreneur might be able to convince a politician not to divide bribes with 
others, thus obtaining exclusive protection. This is not to suggest that the presence of a cartel 
on one side of the market automatically brings it about on the other also, but simply that when 
a “bilateral monopoly” is realised, the probability that the resulting equilibrium is stable
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increases.
21 Hall (1996), in a study on private taxi service in Hong Kong, explains how police officers 
had elaborated a complex but efficient system to protect the circulation of taxi-drivers, who 
systematically corrupted them: in order to distinguish those they protected from the others, 
special badges were provided to those who paid the bribes. The form and colour of these 
badges changes every week, with every payment.
22 The former PSI administrative secretary Vincenzo Balzamo so instructed his assistant: 
“Never get money from anybody, because I have the parliamentary immunity, but you don’t” 
(L'Espresso February 14, 1993, 53). We may also observe that in 1992 and 1993 the initial 
successes of “mani pulite” was connected with the sudden weakening—due to the same 
judicial inquiries and to electoral defeats—of the main political parties and their leaders, that 
previously acted as guarantors of corrupt dealings.
23 For instance, the price payed by the public administation for public contracts has at present 
become almost an half than before mani pulite investigation: from 300-350 to 150/250 
milliards lira/km for the construction of the underground in Milan; from 83 to 40 milliards lira 
/km for the railway link (Corriere della Sera, 21 January 1997, 5).
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